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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL
SERVICES, INC.,

:

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
:
vs.

Case No. 14335

CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL
AIRWAYS, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

t

The Plaintiff and Appellant DeBry and Hilton Travel

Services, Inc., respectfully petitions this Honorable Court
for rehearing in the above-entitled case, pursuant to Rule
76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the following
reasons:
1.

The Court's interpretation of regulations of

the Civil Aeronautics Board is in direct conflict with the
controlling federal statute providing remedies to the parties.
2.

The trial court did not make and enter findings

of fact or conclusions upon which the above-entitled Court
based its opinion.
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(5£ARK W. S E S S I
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The petition of Plaintiff-Appellant DeBry and Hilton
Travel Services, Inc., is not filed for the purpose of rearguing matters originally presented.

It is intended to

bring to the Court's attention errors in its conclusions
and an omission to consider material points in the case. The
petition is within the criteria established by this Court for
the granting of rehearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS OF THE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE
CONTROLLING FEDERAL STATUTE PROVIDING REMEDIES TO THE
PARTIES.
The Court's Opinion is based largely upon an inter1
pretation of regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
X

14 C.F.R., § 208.3(b) (1976).
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In its Opinion, the Court states as follows:
"It is not open to question and the findings of
the trial court recite that the Civil Aeronautics Board
Regulations apply to both defendant Capitol, as a supplemental air carrier, and to plaintiffs DeBry, as
ticket agent, and that they require a written agreement
for the payment of commissions to a ticket agent."
The Opinion goes on to quote in pertinent part
Section 208.31a of the CAB Regulations as follows:
"Each agreement between a supplemental air
carrier and any ticket . . . agent shall be reduced
to. writing and signed by all the parties thereto, if
it relates to any of the following subjects . . . (b)
The arranging for flights for the accomodation of
persons . . . ;"
Later in the Opinion, the Court, in interpreting the
purposes of the Regulation quoted above, indicates that one of
the main purposes in requiring a contract of the nature here
in question to be in writing is to provide a sound foundation
for settling disputes which may arise as to who is entitled to
commissions; and further that a party claiming such commissions has a burden of proving such a written contract or
otherwise satisfying the requirement.

In short, the above-

entitled Court construes the Regulation to be a sort of
"statute of frauds" for the airline charter industry.
DeBry respectfully submits, however, that the aboveentitled Court's analysis has overlooked and ignored the
controlling federal statute specifying the remedies of parties
which provides as follows:
"Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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chapter are in addition to such remedies." (emphasis
added)
49 U.S.C.A. § 1506.
It would follow, then, that if DeBry was entitled
to enforce the terms of an oral brokerage contract and to
collect commissions at common law, the federal statute would
prohibit the regulations from in any way abridging or altering DeBry's rights with respect thereto.

Notwithstanding

the general rule that statutes requiring contracts for the
employment of brokers to be in writing are in derogation of
2
the common law, the above-entitled Court has held that DeBry
cannot enforce and collect such commissions under common law
principles without first "proving such a written contract or
otherwise satisfying the requirement."

Such a holding appears

to be in direct conflict with the clear language of the statute and such a holding does in fact alter and abridge DeBryfs
right with respect to commissions and the enforcement of the
terms of an oral brokerage contract the existence of which
was stipulated to by both of the respective parties. The
foregoing principles were presented to the above-entitled
Court on pages 23-25 of the Brief of Appellant.
The legislative history of Section 208.31a of the
Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations sustains the conclusion
that such section was originally implemented to assist the
CAB in policing the activities of charter airlines by
2

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers, § 41, p. 803.
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imposing certain reporting requirements on such charter airlines , not to defeat the right of a broker to commissions
due the broker under the terms of an oral brokerage contract.
The geneology of that regulation is as follows:
On November 15, 1955, by Order E-9744, the CAB
granted exemption authority to a number of charter air
carriers (then called "large irregular carriers").

One

condition of this authority was that the agreements between
>

the air carriers and the ticket agents be reduced to writing.
By Order E-13436 issued January 28, 1959, the CAB
granted Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity to
23 supplemental airlines.

The condition requiring written

contracts between carriers and their ticket agents was carried
over from the exemptions to these certificates.
A condition requiring written contracts remained in
the certificates until September 27, 1966, when it was moved
to the Regulations, becoming Section 298.31a by the Board's
Order in the Supplemental Air Service Proceedings.
The regulatory intent can be traced from 14 C.F.R.
Part 242 (August 28, 1952), which states in part:

"The

proposed amendments are designed to obtain more uniform and
in some respects more detailed data in response to these
reporting requirements of these provisions of the regulations."
Compare 14 C.F.R. Part 242 (January 7, 1953), which
states:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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" . . . the objectives are to improve uniformity of
reported information and to provide the Board with
more adequate information."
A companion regulation requires contracts for
charter carriage to be in writing.

14 C.F.R. Part 208.31b.

The regulatory history of that section is similar:
"The execution and retention of written contracts
on the other hand will greatly assist the Board in
monitoring the carriers1 compliance with charter
regulations and Board tariffs."
14 C.F.R. Part 208 (June 20, 1967).
Thus it is clearly the Board's intent to regulate
the air carrier for protection of the public, not to give the
air carrier a loophole through which it can avoid its common
law obligations pursuant to a contract formed under weill
established common law principles.

The title to Part 208 of

the regulations, "Terms, Conditions and Limitations of Certificates to Engage in Supplemental Air Transportation", 14
C.F.R. Part 208.1, reflects that the regulations are aimed
not at the public or even the air charter industry.

The

regulation is a part of the carriers' Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity—nothing more, nothing less,

The

Certificate so conditioned may fairly be paraphrased as
follows:

Capitol is permitted to engage in the business of

k

a charter airline on the condition (inter alia) that Capitol
maintain written records of all its transactions.

The effect

of Capitol's failure to satisfy such a condition is simply
that Capitol violates the term of its Certificate.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It stretches

the imagination to suppose that the Civil Aeronautics Board
ever intended (let alone had the power and authority) to
abrogate or change the common law requirements of the validity
and enforceability of contracts.
The Opinion rendered by the above-entitled Court
will have far-reaching effects on the entire charter airline industry.

That industry is now regulated by a delicate

balance of common law principles as well as complex Govern>

ment regulations.

The Opinion of this Court has by judicial

interpretation imposed a further unwarranted requirement on
the entire airline charter industry.

This is particularly

true where, as in the instant case, the contract forms are
not submitted by the airline (Capitol) for execution by the
broker (DeBry) until after the flights are negotiated,
prices and terms finalized and agreed upon and the broker's
performance substantially completed (R. 811). Such a
requirement leaves no protection to a broker who in good
faith introduces his customer to the airline, negotiates
the terms of transportation and is willing to execute the
written contract.

It is difficult to believe that the regu-

lations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as interpreted by
the above-entitled Courts contemplate such a result, particularly where the obvious legislative intent is to require the
airline to comply with record keeping requirements and to
provide the CAB with uniform and detailed reported information.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE AND ENTER FINDINGS
OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS UPON WHICH THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT BASED ITS OPINION.
The Court recognizes that "procuring cause" is a
central issue in this case.

The Opinion states in part,

"Plaintiffs urge that even though they had no written contract they were entitled to the commissions
because: (a) the evidence shows that they were the
actual procuring agency in booking the flights in
question . . . . We recognize the soundness of the
principles of law advocated by Plaintiffs as to the
propositions just stated. . . . "
DeBry pointed out on pages 8 through 16 of the
Brief of Appellant that procuring cause is the central issue
in any litigation over brokerage commissions.

Frederick May

& Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962).
However, after correctly acknowledging the importance of the procuring cause issue, this Court concluded that
the trial court had made a finding on that issue.

The

Opinion states:
"We recognize the soundness of the principles
of law advocated by plaintiffs as to the propositions
just stated, [procuring cause] when they are applied
under appropriate circumstances. But the difficulty
with the plaintiff's position is that the trial court
did not find the facts as they contend to bring the
case within those principles . . . . However plausible
the plaintiff's arguments may seem to themselves, the
trial court, whose prerogative it is to find facts, was
not so persuaded."
This Court's Opinion speculates that DeBry was not
the procuring:cause, for the sale.

However there is absolutely

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nothing in the findings adopted by the trial court on the
issue of procuring cause.

There is simply no way to stretch

the findings of the trial court to include anything concerning
the issue of "procuring cause."
DeBry specifically requested the Court to make a
finding on this material issue, but the trial court made
none.

The trial court might have made a finding that DeBry

was the procuring cause or the trial court might l^ave made
a finding that DeBry was not the procuring cause.

However,

the court made no finding either way, which DeBry respectfully submits the trial court was required to do as a matter
of law.

Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43,

278 P.2d 284 (1954).

Such a finding either way would elimin-

ate any speculation as to whether DeBry was or was not the
procuring cause of the flights in question.
DeBry has contended and argued, both in the trial
court and in this appeal, that the arrangement for all three
parties to execute a charter agency agreement was only a
formality.

The trial court determined that such arrange-

ment was a condition precedent to DeBry's entitlement to
receive commission.
The thrust of the opinion of the above-entitled
Court is that the findings of fact of the trial court would
not now be reviewed.

DeBry respectfully submits that the

construction of the arrangement between the parties as a
condition precedent or a formality is an issue of law for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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the above-entitled Court to determine.

If the arrangement

was a condition precedent as the trial court determined and
the condition was not waived by Capitol, the decision of the
trial court was proper.

If the reverse is true, the judg-

ment of the trial court should be reversed.

It is just that

simple.
While the above-entitled Court is on solid ground
in its refusal to weigh the evidence presented in the trial
court, it appears that the Opinion of this Court does not
consider this, the pivotal legal issue, properly presented
for review, i.e., Was the arrangement for all three parties
to execute a charter agency agreement a condition precedent
to DeBry's entitlement to commissions or a mere formality
after DeBry's substantial performance?

The general rule

with respect to this question has been stated as follows:
"It has been said that conditions precedent
are not favored and the courts will not construe
stipulations to be such unless required to do so
by plain, unambiguous language or by necessary
implication. This is particularly so when interpreting a stipulation as a condition precedent
rather than a promise or covenant would work a
forfeiture or result in inequitable consequences."
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 321.
This issue was presented in detail on pages 20
and 21 of the Brief of Appellant and pages 11 through 13 of
the Reply Brief of Appellant.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant DeBry
and Hilton Travel Services, Inc., respectfully submits that
its Petition for Rehearing should be granted.
illy submittec

URK W.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing and Appellant's Brief
in Support of Petition for Rehearing was mailed to STRONG &
HANNI, Suite 604, Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,
and to GINSBURG & KOHN, 9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800,
Beverly Hills, California, 90 212, Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent Capitol International Airways, Inc., in a
postage prepaid, properly addressed envelope, on this
day of November, 1976.

CLAiSK W. SESSIONS
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